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Comedy Means
Never Having to
Say You’re Sorry
Jordan Alexander Stein
Harm’s Way: Tragic Responsibility
and the Novel Form by Sandra
Macpherson. Baltimore, MD:
Johns Hopkins University Press,
2010. Pp. 237. $55.00 cloth.

Harm’s Way takes issue with the one
thing everybody knows about the
novel; namely, that it is a vehicle—
indeed, the vehicle—for the rise of
bourgeois individualism. Famously
outlined in the 1950s by Ian Watt’s
The Rise of the Novel (1957) and
enriched since the 1980s by Marxists, feminists, and Foucaultians,
this dominant story aligns the English novel with the development of
psychology, the rise of companionate marriage, and the actualization of modern personhood—in
short, with what Harm’s Way designates succinctly as the “interiority thesis” (16). But the only thing
more succinct than Harm’s Way’s
designations is its dispatch. In five
short chapters, the book makes an
impressively bold and impeccably
graceful case against the idea that
the realist novel can and should be
considered the vehicle for which it
has so long been taken.
Instead, Harm’s Way argues
that “[t]he realist novel is a project of blame not exculpation” (13).
Unfolding from this claim is an
intervention into the ways that critics of the novel have been oriented
to the idea of action. Harm’s Way
contends that the widely accepted
view that characters drive plots
through their actions (a view that
grants agency to human figures
and so complies with the interiority thesis) is ultimately a “comic”
orientation, exemplified in the sentimental novel that terminates in
marriage. The book accordingly
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shows comedy to be a narrative
form of limited liability, such that
the responsibility a character assumes (and should assume) for
her or his actions is tempered by
subjective issues, including things
like intention, moral disposition,
or states of affection and desire. In
comedy, good intentions cancel bad
actions (and thus comedy, the book
notes in a typically and wryly stylish moment, “means never having
to say you’re sorry” [15]). Alternatively, Harm’s Way posits a “tragic”
orientation to action in the novel,
in which character is “an effect of
the action” (8, emphasis retained)
rather than the other way around;
or again, in which “character happens to and does not usher from
persons” (174). This formal point
manifests in narratives of strict (as
opposed to limited) liability—narratives which assume that “interior” issues such as intention or the
goodness of a person (or character)
are irrelevant to the formal condition of harm that persons (or characters) may produce. Far from recognizing persons for their interior
depths, Harm’s Way shows that
strict liability recognizes persons as
“causes rather than agents,” “matter in motion,” (165, 23, emphasis
retained). But, ultimately an argument about responsibility, the
book assures its reader that “if this
is quite literally dehumanizing, it
is not, therefore, inhumane” (23).
While Harm’s Way grants out
of hand that strict liability is not

evident in all eighteenth-century
British novels—that it is, in fact,
“a liberal countertradition” (4)—
the book’s wager that accounts of
strict liability are present in texts
as foundational to the study of the
English novel as Moll Flanders,
Roxanna, and Clarissa leaves one
wondering how “counter” this tradition can ultimately be. And that,
surely, is the point, as Harm’s Way
proceeds by handling the most
apposite case studies (e.g., Defoe,
Richardson, and Fielding) in the
most strikingly counterintuitive
ways. To be sure, the book opens
up new readings of familiar texts
by Defoe and Richardson, but
the standout example is the third
chapter on Fielding, whose Joseph
Andrews and Tom Jones conform
so well to the book’s understanding of the comic version of the
realist novel, and contrast so strikingly with Richardson especially,
that they are used to demonstrate
the book’s claims in reverse. The
unusualness of this move makes
it worth pausing over, for nearly
a fifth of Harm’s Way’s narrative is
devoted to the rigorous discussion
and ultimate assimilation of texts
that, avowedly, do not themselves
prove its point. If few arguments
would attempt such a daring turn,
many fewer could sustain it as
well as this book does, and even
a reader who could somehow fail
to appreciate the theoretical reach
of the book’s claims or the deftness
of its close readings could not fail

	On Macpherson’s harm’s way
to admire the sheer fearlessness of
the book’s style of argumentation.
A final chapter on Frances
Sheridan’s Memoirs of Miss Sidney Bidulph pushes the argument’s
feminist implication, “to uncouple
harm from nonconsent” (146).
Such an uncoupling demonstrates
that one can be “impelled” to an
action that one then performs and
for which one is therefore responsible, without having needed to
make a conscious choice or to express something about one’s self.
This relatively simple point has
startlingly complex implications,
underscored by the dicey example
of male rape, where bodily gameness is often recognized as equal
to consent. And while an erection
may not, of course, necessarily be a
sign of consent, Harm’s Way takes
a different track, arguing instead
that consent is irrelevant not just
to rape but to sexual activity of all
kinds. Advancing the position that
one is “responsible for what he
cannot help but have done” (150),
Harm’s Way assigns responsibility
to all who happened to be party to a
harm, victim and perpetrator alike,
regardless of what anyone wanted
or meant to do. The strict assignment of responsibility for action
in this chapter ties together prior
threads of argument (that Roxanna is in part responsible for the
death of her daughter; that Clarissa
is in part responsible for her rape)
in order to show that this accounting for responsibility—“We are
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responsible, though we are not at
fault” (49)—offers a radically formalist way of reckoning a politics
(and an ethics) of gender equity.
The novels under discussion, like
the legal logic of strict liability with
which they contend, show us that
“[i]n exchange for the exigencies of
embodiment, literature offers the
compensations of form” (174).
If such claims sound unlike any
one may elsewhere have encountered in a field as densely populated
as the history of the novel, that
innovation is entirely to Harm’s
Way’s credit. But though I sincerely
admire the book’s creativity and accomplishment, though I am certain
that anyone working in the field
will have to contend with it, I admit
that I hesitate to feel entirely persuaded by it. Without a doubt, the
book’s wonderful readings do have
me convinced that strict liability is
far more of an intellectual context
for the eighteenth-century British novel than I ever might have
thought. But the political dimension of the argument, the idea that
intentions ought to be irrelevant to
actions, I am slower to accept. As
it develops this point, Harm’s Way
rather heroically argues that its
unyielding theory of responsibility—and the aesthetic formalism
that, the book also demonstrates,
aligns with strict liability—generates a powerful counterargument
to forms of privilege grounded in
the body (specifically, in sex and
species), and I certainly find this

140

Jordan Alexander stein

visionary move to be an attractive
one. However, perhaps what makes
it attractive, rather than persuasive,
is the absoluteness of its presentation. The lockstep alignment of the
book’s terms are entirely compelling within the book’s argument,
but not as plausible when one
considers examples on which the
book’s argument does not touch. It
is difficult to imagine, for instance,
that texts like Pamela or Robinson
Crusoe depict characters as causes
rather than agents. While Harm’s
Way may wish to classify these as
comedic texts, rather than tragic
ones working through a logic of
strict liability, it nevertheless seems
to me that the strongly Christian
motifs in these novels, which develop and reward the refinement
of interior states, are also legible
in a more clearly tragic novel like
Clarissa. And though I suppose
that the presence of strict liability in
Clarissa does not preclude the possibility that the text is simultaneously concerned with other means
of imagining action, one does not
get the sense reading Harm’s Way
that it is possible to have a lenient
account of strict liability.
Be that as it may, there is no
conclusion one can have about this
book other than that it is the finest
kind of literary criticism—remarkably lively, thoroughly researched,
cogently argued, and brilliantly
counterintuitive. And generous.
For as we engage seriously with the

book’s argument about strict liability, we might happily discover that
we too are perhaps responsible for
something this truly great.
Jordan Alexander Stein teaches English at
the University of Colorado at Boulder.

